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I n a controversial six to three decision, the Supreme Court 
of the United States, in Romer v. 
Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), 
held that "Amendment 2," a pro-
posed amendment to the Colorado 
state constitution, violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The 
Court found no legitimate state 
interest advanced by an amend-
ment which denied homosexuals 
the pursuit of legal protections 
afforded to other groups. In so 
holding, the Court rejected morally 
based legislation burdening a par-
ticular class and created an uncer-
tain future for legislation based on 
moral ideals. 
In 1992, rolorado's state con-
stitution was amended as the result 
of a statewide referendum. The 
impetus for the referendum stem-
med from numerous municipal 
ordinances banning discrimina-
tion in areas such as housing, em-
ployment, education, public ac-
commodations, and health and 
welfare services. Amendment 2 
repealed these ordinances to the 
extent that they prohibited discrim-
ination based on sexual orienta-
tion. In its explicit terms, Amend-
ment 2 prohibited all legislative, 
executive and judicial action de-
signed to protect homosexuals or 
bisexuals. 
Shortly following its adoption, 
litigation to invalidate Amendment 
2 began. In the District Court for 
the County of Denver, plaintiffs, 
many of whom were homosexual, 
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argued that the enforcement of 
Amendment 2 would subject them 
to the immediate risk of discrimi-
nation. The court granted a pre-
liminary injunction and an appeal 
was taken to the Supreme Court of 
Colorado. Colorado's highest 
court sustained the injunction and 
remanded the case for further con-
sideration, holding that strict scru-
tiny was the proper standard of 
review and finding that Amend-
ment 2 infringed the fundamental 
right of gays and lesbians to partic-
ipate in the political process. 
On remand, the district court 
found that the State failed to show 
that Amendment 2 had been nar-
rowly tailored to meet a compel-
ling governmental interest. The 
Supreme Court of Colorado af-
firmed the district court and the 
Supreme Court of the United 
States granted certiorari to decide 
whether Amendment 2 violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court began its analysis by 
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declaring as "implausible" the 
State's argument that Amendment 
2 merely places gays and lesbians 
in the same position as all other 
persons. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 
1624. Pointing to the findings of 
the Colorado Supreme Court, the 
Court found that, since Amend-
ment 2 repealed existing statutes 
and regulations barring discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation, 
the "ultimate effect" of Amend-
ment 2 was to limit all governmen-
tal bodies from adopting similarly 
protective measures "unless the 
state constitution is first amended 
to permit such measures." Id. at 
1625 (citing Evans v. Romer, 854 
P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993)). Homo-
sexuals, according to the Court, 
were thus deprived of previously 
enjoyed legal protection from dis-
criminatory injuries, and any hopes 
of the reinstatement of those 
protections would be quashed. Id. 
The Court acknowledged that 
the Fourteenth Amendment does 
not grant Congress the power to 
prohibit discrimination in places of 
public accommodations. Id. (cit-
ing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 
(1883)). For this reason, Colo-
rado, like most other states, has 
enacted its own statutes to prevent 
such discrimination. Id. Such 
statutes often provide a broad 
definition of public accom-
modation which includes "hotels, 
restaurants, ... insurance agencies, 
and 'shops and stores dealing with 
goods or services of any kind. '" 
ld. (quoting Denver Rev. Munici-
27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 43 
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pal Code, Art. IV, § 28-92). 
In admonishing the effect of 
Amendment 2, the Court pointed 
out that not only were homosexu-
als barred from the protections of 
public accommodation laws, but 
legislation that had been enacted to 
stem discrimination against homo-
sexuals was repealed. Id. at 1626. 
For instance, a certain Colorado 
executive order which "forbids 
employment discrimination against 
all state employees ... on the basis 
of sexual orientation," would have 
been repealed. Id. (citing Exec. 
Order No. D0035, 3 C.F.R. 
(1990)). 
According to the Court, the 
promise of equal protection of the 
laws must co-exist with the practi-
cal reality that most laws inevita-
bly classify one group, resulting in 
a possible disadvantage to one or 
more other groups. Id. at 1627 
(citing Personnel Adm'r of Mass. 
v. Fenney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)). 
Therefore, if the legislation neither 
burdens a fundamental right nor 
targets a suspect class, it would be 
upheld as long as it bears a rational 
relation to a legitimate governmen-
tal purpose. Id. (citing Heller v. 
Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993)). 
According to the majority, 
Amendment 2 failed even this very 
deferential rational review test. Id. 
at 1627. The Court found that 
Amendment 2 imposed a "broad 
and undifferentiated" burden on 
homosexuals simply because the 
group is politically unpopular, and 
further, by its far reaching implica-
tions, could only be a result of 
"animus" toward the targeted class 
- homosexuals. Id. at 1628. For 
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these reasons, the Court strongly 
rejected the notion that Amend-
ment 2 satisfied a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest and any ratio-
nale for it was equally non-
existent. Id. The Court sum-
marized that it considered Amend-
ment 2 to be simply a status based 
infringement on homosexuals' 
rights devoid of any "relationship 
to legitimate state interests," and 
as such, violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. Id. at 1629. 
Justice Scalia, in a somewhat 
acerbic dissent, challenged the 
majority's decision from several 
perspectives. First, he found dis-
tasteful the majority's creation of 
the principle of law that a person 
or group is denied equal protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment 
when they, in order to gain an ad-
vantage, are required to seek a 
more difficult avenue of recourse 
than others. Id. at 1630. 
Assuming that Amendment 2, 
in fact, disadvantaged homosexu-
als instead of merely refusing to 
bestow special privileges upon 
them, the dissent next questioned 
how actions which disadvantage a 
group for conduct ruled criminal in 
many states could possibly be a 
violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause. Id. at 1631-32. Justice 
Scalia asserted that "[i]f it is con-
stitutionally permissible for a State 
to make homosexual conduct crim-
inal, surely it is constitutionally 
permissible for a State to enact 
other laws merely disfavoring 
homosexual conduct." Id. at 1631 
(citing the Court's approval of 
such laws in Bowers v. Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186 (1986)). 
Next, Justice Scalia attacked 
the majority opinion by anal-
ogizing homosexuality to polyg-
amy. He pointed out that several 
states were required to perma-
nently prohibit polygamy in order 
to be granted statehood, thus 
targeting polygamists for dis-
favored status. Id. at 1635. The 
majority would, therefore, suggest 
that the "perceived social harm of 
polygamy is a 'legitimate concern 
of government,' and the perceived 
social harm of homosexuality is 
not." Id. at 1636. 
Finally, Justice Scalia took 
issue with the Court's position in 
what he perceived as the "culture 
wars." Id. at 1637. He stated that 
Amendment 2 was conceived to 
stay the decay of sexual morality 
and was sanctioned by a majority 
of Colorado residents. By striking 
it down, according to Justice 
Scalia, the Court acted out of "po-
litical will" as opposed to "judicial 
judgment." Id. 
As a result of the decision in 
Romer v. Evans, groups that en-
gage in a lifestyle that is ap-
parently considered unacceptable 
by a majority of voters, yet possess 
a large and influential political 
lobby, will not be denied pro-
tections against discrimination 
which are in excess of those be-
stowed upon everyone else. The 
Court has declared that a duly en-
acted referendum to a state consti-
tution, which denies special pro-
tections to homosexuals based on 
their sexual orientation, is invalid. 
It is apparent that the Court is 
attempting to protect a class which 
is largely unpopular. In the future, 
however, courts will be free to 
strike down what they perceive as 
politically incorrect legislation 
regardless of its position with 
respect to moral ideals. The Court 
is of the opinion that there can be 
no legitimate governmental in-
terest advanced by legislation 
which promotes the moral and 
religious attitudes of the con-
stituency but also burdens an un-
popular class. It would be inter-
esting to see if the Court would be 
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of the same opinion if confronted 
with an equally passionate con-
stitutional challenge to legislation 
which similarly burdens such 
morally distasteful groups such as 
prostitutes and polygamists. 
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